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Abstract
The U.S. Tax Program for Swiss banks is a very significant part of the recent history of the Swiss financial industry. It has
accelerated the transformation of the Swiss banking industry from a system that relied on bank secrecy to a much
more compliant one. It was also rather costly for the banks involved. This short paper tries to identify the determinants
of the individual penalties that were levied by the DoJ. We find that U.S. assets under management is the most
important determinant. However, the average size of the accounts, the behavior of the bank vis-à-vis its American
clients, the solvency of the bank, and the point in time when the bank settled with the DoJ also matter.
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Introduction
In August 2013, the U.S. Department of Justice (DoJ) and
the Swiss Federal Department of Finance issued a joint
statement that created the U.S. Tax Program for Swiss
Banks (“the program”). This program paved the way for
ending the conflict that had emerged between the two
countries concerning Swiss bank secrecy (DoJ 2013).
At the time, the DoJ had collected evidence that several
Swiss banks had systematically helped U.S. tax subjects to
evade taxation. Several Swiss banks were already under
criminal investigation by the DoJ. The largest of these
banks, UBS, had settled in 2009 and received a deferred
prosecution agreement (DPA) in exchange for full coop-
eration with the DoJ, including providing names of clients
and employees, and a penalty of USD 780 million. One
bank (Wegelin) collapsed in 2012 as a consequence of
the conflict with the DoJ. Six major banks (Credit Suisse,
Bank Julius Bär, Pictet, HSBC, Zürcher Kantonalbank, and
Basler Kantonalbank) and eight smaller banks had also
been charged but had not yet settled at the time of the cre-
ation of the program. Other banks were at risk of being
implicated in the DoJ’s investigation. The whole Swiss
banking industry appeared to be under siege.
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International pressure on Swiss bank secrecy had
already been mounting for some time. Before the U.S.
came into play, there had been a series of initiatives led by
the OECD to increase transparency and induce coopera-
tion among countries on taxation. With respect to bank
secrecy, the OECD tried to establish the free exchange
of information between tax authorities, or ideally the
automatic exchange of information on tax subjects. This
amounts to abolishing bank secrecy for tax purposes.
The strategy of the OECD relied mainly on blacklisting
non-cooperative jurisdictions, thereby hoping that this
public shaming would prove effective. In successive nego-
tiations between Switzerland and the EU, a withholding
tax on interest income was introduced, and the distinction
between tax evasion and tax fraud was removed, thereby
easing the way for an EU tax authority to request infor-
mation on bank accounts in Switzerland about which they
were suspicious. However, in all these negotiations, bank
secrecy itself was fully preserved.
Delaloye et al. (2012) use this period of prolonged nego-
tiations to estimate the value of bank secrecy for UBS
and CS (the two largest international universal banks in
Switzerland) and two large Swiss private banks (Julius Bär
and Vontobel). They extract the effect on the stock prices
of these banks that is due to particular events connected to
the negotiations. The only event that has a negative effect
on UBS and CS was a letter by EU Commissioner Frits
Bolkestein published in the Financial Times. The authors
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interpret this letter as hinting towards possible sanctions
and loss of access to the EU financial market. Two other
events related to the introduction of the withholding tax
affected the two private banks, but not the large univer-
sal banks. The authors conclude that bank secrecy was of
significant value only for the two private banks, whereas
its value for the two international universal banks was
zero. These banks feared loss of market access much more
and might therefore have been in favor of abolishing bank
secrecy in order not to jeopardize market access.
Emmenegger (2017) asks the question of why bank
secrecy, having been well established for decades in
Switzerland, ultimately fell. He argues essentially that the
Swiss state depends on the viability of the large interna-
tional banks, and these banks depend on access to the
U.S. financial market. By threatening to deny these banks
access to this important market, the USA was able to force
the Swiss government to agree. Having publicly admitted
to wrongdoing, Switzerland was then unable to withstand
reform, also vis-à-vis other jurisdictions.
We do not find this argument completely convincing.
It is obvious that access to the U.S. financial market is
vital, but it is not obvious that access to the EU finan-
cial market is less vital. So why was the U.S. so much
more successful than the EU in its handling of Switzer-
land? We are not legal or political science scholars, but it
is interesting that the EU was negotiating with the Swiss
government, whereas the DoJ was attacking Swiss corpo-
rations. Its first target was the biggest bank in the country,
no less. This is in line with the guidelines set by the DoJ
with respect to charging corporations: “[. . . ] corporations
are likely to take immediate remedial steps when one is
indicted for criminal conduct that is pervasive throughout
a particular industry, and thus an indictment often pro-
vides a unique opportunity for deterrence on a massive
scale [. . . ]” (Holder (1999), Section I.B). It is conceivable
that this strategy was far more effective than the sham-
ing and negotiating strategy of the OECD and the EU. We
agree with Emmenegger (2017) about the aftermath of the
program: after it was publicly established that Swiss banks
had helped customers to avoid taxation, it was impossible
to keep bank secrecy alive.
The program is a significant part of recent Swiss finan-
cial history. It contains material for scholars of law, polit-
ical scientists, historians, and, of course, economists. The
aim of this short paper, however, is not to analyze the
long-term effects of the program, but is much more mun-
dane. We simply study the determinants of the penalties
that were paid by category 2 banks. We find that there
are five determinants. First, the most important variable
determining the fines is the maximum U.S.-related assets
under management. This finding is in line with the formal
definition of the program. Second, the DoJ lists particular
types of behavior it found in the participating banks. We
find a few such behaviors that prove valuable in explaining
the penalties. Third, the average assets under manage-
ment per account is also an important determinant. Banks
with the same assets under management but whose assets
belonged to a larger number of smaller clients paid larger
penalties than if the bank had fewer, but larger, clients.
Fourth, we find some evidence that the solvency of the
banks at the end of 2013 may have played a role as well.
Banks that had a low leverage ratio (i.e., high levels of
capital compared to their balance sheets) received higher
penalties than banks that were less solvent. Fifth, the DoJ
seems to have eased the fines as the program evolved.
Controlling for the other variables, we find that the fines
for the banks that settled last were significantly smaller
than the ones that settled early.We have no indication why
this is the case.
Basics of the program
Participation in the program was voluntary, and some
banks indeed opted not to participate. The program
allowed the industry to resolve the U.S. tax issue in a
structured and relatively predictable manner. The last
paragraph of the DoJ Tax Division’s comment on the
program makes this very clear:
“Each eligible Swiss bank should carefully weigh the
benefits of coming forward, and the risks of not taking
this opportunity to be fully forthcoming. A bank that
has engaged in or facilitated U.S. tax-related or
monetary transaction crimes has a unique opportunity
to resolve its criminal liability under the Program.
Those that have criminal exposure but fail to come
forward or participate but are not fully forthcoming do
so at considerable risk”. (DoJ Tax Division (2013), p. 4)
The first step for a participating bank is to request per-
mission from the Swiss Federal Department of Finance to
participate. Such permission is necessary because coop-
erating with a foreign government to the extent required
by the program without prior permission constitutes a
breach of Art. 271 Abs. 1 of the Swiss penal code.1 In July
2013, the Finance Department published a model request
for banks to apply for such permission (EFD 2013).
The second step is for the banks to declare their willing-
ness to participate in the program by submitting a letter
of intent (LOI). The deadline for this was December 31,
2013. The program divided the banks into four categories,
and banks have to indicate to which category they want
to belong.2 Category 4 banks are financial institutions
with local client bases who are deemed compliant. Cate-
gory 3 banks are banks that are not category 4, but who
have not committed tax-related or monetary transactions
offenses against U.S. law. Category 2 is for banks that are
not category 1 but have reason to believe they may have
committed tax-related offenses. Category 1 are banks that
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were already under criminal investigation (the aforemen-
tioned fourteen banks). These banks are excluded from
the program.
Category 3 and 4 banks have to provide evidence for
their classification, which is then verified by an indepen-
dent examiner (at the expense of the bank). In exchange,
the bank is offered a non target letter (NTL), which is
essentially just a document stating that the bank is not, at
that time, the target of any criminal investigation autho-
rized by the DoJ’s tax division.
Category 2 banks are the focus of the program. Banks
that fulfill the requirements of the program are offered a
non-prosecution agreement (NPA). An NPA is very sim-
ilar to a DPA. In both cases, the bank is not convicted
of any crime and does not formally admit guilt, but full
cooperation and typically the payment of a penalty are
required.3 The process and the obligations of category 2
banks are explained in the next section in greater detail.
All category 2, 3, and 4 banks have in the meantime set-
tled with the DoJ and have received NPAs or NTLs. Some
category 1 banks, however, have not yet settled. Two of
these banks have been liquidated in the meantime (Bank
Frey and Neue Zürcher Bank). According to DoJ data, the
category 1 banks that have settled so far had an aggregate
maximum amount of assets under management (AuM)
belonging to U.S. clients of USD 38 billion. They have paid
penalties of about USD 4.4 billion. The category 2 banks
had in total maximum assets under management belong-
ing to U.S. clients of roughly USD 50 billion and have, in
sum, paid penalties of USD 1.37bn.4 Other Swiss (non-
bank) companies are also under investigation or have been
charged and have settled similar disputes with the DoJ. For
instance, the wealth management company Prime Part-
ners in Geneva is a family office, not a bank. They received
an NPA in exchange for full cooperation (e.g., naming of
clients) and a penalty of USD 5million.5 Since Prime Part-
ners is not a bank, the program was not open to them and
this paper does not include such cases.
Category 2
In order for a bank to be granted an NPA, it has to ful-
fill three obligations. It must provide detailed information,
it must provide assistance to the DoJ in implicating other
individuals, and it must pay a penalty. The process is
explained in detail in DoJ (2013) and DoJ Tax Division
(2013).
Information The bank must disclose the total number
of U.S.-related accounts, as well as the maximum balance
on these accounts for three periods: on August 1, 2008,
between August 1, 2008, and February 28, 2009, and after
February 28, 2009.
In addition, the bank must provide information about
the amount and form of the transfer of funds into and out
of the account during the applicable period. In particular,
it must show where the funds came from and where they
went to (i.e., identification of intermediary or financial
institution and its domicile). This information is clearly
intended so that the DoJ is able to follow the money and
implicate other institutions or individuals.
The bank must identify further its internal procedures
for the handling of U.S. clients and accounts. This infor-
mation includes the names of employees involved in
acquiring, operating, and supervising such accounts. In
particular the names of the relationship manager, client
advisor, assetmanager, financial advisor, trustee, fiduciary,
nominee, attorney, or accountant at any time during the
relevant period have to be submitted. The information
also includes internal reporting and communication with
management on such matters.
The above information has to be verified (at the expense
of the bank) by an independent examiner.
Assistance Interestingly, the bank does not disclose the
identities of the U.S. account holders themselves. Doing
so would violate Swiss bank secrecy law. However, upon
request, the bank will provide testimony and assist the
USA in any criminal proceedings. In particular, the bank
provides all information necessary for the USA to draft
treaty requests to seek account information.
Furthermore, the banks will close all non-compliant
U.S.-related accounts. They will also prevent their
employees from assisting U.S. account holders with fur-
ther concealment. Moreover, the banks will open new
U.S.-related accounts only if they can ensure that the
account will be declared to the USA and will be subject to
disclosure by the Swiss bank. This effectively terminates
Swiss bank secrecy for U.S. customers vis-à-vis the U.S.
government for category 2 banks.
Penalty The program specifies a formula for computing
the penalty:
“Upon execution of an NPA, the Swiss Bank will agree
to pay as a penalty:
1. for U.S. Related Accounts that existed on August
1, 2008, an amount equal to 20% of the maximum
aggregate dollar value of all such accounts during
the Applicable Period;
2. for U.S. Related Accounts that were opened
between August 1, 2008, and February 28, 2009,
an amount equal to 30% of the maximum
aggregate dollar value of all such accounts; and
3. for U.S. Related Accounts that were opened after
February 28, 2009, an amount equal to 50% of the
maximum aggregate value of all such accounts.
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The determination of the maximum dollar value of the
aggregated U.S. Related Accounts may be reduced by
the dollar value of each account as to which the Swiss
Bank demonstrates, to the satisfaction of the Tax
Division, was not an undeclared account, was disclosed
by the Swiss Bank to the U.S. Internal Revenue Service,
or was disclosed to the U.S. Internal Revenue Service
through an announced Offshore Voluntary Disclosure
Program or Initiative following notification by the
Swiss Bank of such a program or initiative and prior to
the execution of the NPA”. (DoJ 2013, section II.H)
Note that the penalties are rather steep. They are between
20 and 50% of the maximum aggregate amount that was
in these accounts. This is certainly more than the profit
the banks made with these accounts, and very likely more
than the tax that was evaded. Of course, not all U.S.
accounts were undeclared, and it is in fact likely that many
U.S. clients were tax compliant. However, the burden of
proof that some of these accounts were in fact declared to
the IRS lies with the banks.
Even though the program prescribes a rigid formula
for the penalty, the DoJ clearly had some degree of
freedom in determining the fines. On the Tax Program
website, they state: “It is indeed essential to remem-
ber that banks receive a rebate if, for example, they
managed to push clients into the IRS voluntary disclo-
sure program. Furthermore, extraordinary cooperation
might play a role in reducing the fine as well. It fol-
lows that a low penalty could be an indication that the
bank had very little undeclared U.S.-related assets or
that the institution closed undeclared accounts early
in the time period of the U.S. Tax Program, or that a
lot of its U.S. clients participate in a voluntary disclo-
sure program initiated by the bank, or even that the
bank strongly cooperated with the DoJ.” (see http://
www.ustaxprogram.com/penalty-statistics/, emphases
added).
Data
Initially, 87 banks were in category 2. Nine of those6
subsequently left the program or switched to a higher
category, so 78 banks remained in category 2 and went
through with the process. The DoJ provides the indi-
vidual NPAs and summary data for all the 78 banks
that remained in category 2 on the website http://www.
ustaxprogram.com/banks/ (see also https://www.justice.
gov/tax/swiss-bank-program).
According to the program as described in the previous
section, the penalty is a function of the maximum amount
of assets under management (AuM) in three different
periods, minus some potential rebate for extraordinary
cooperation. This hypothesis cannot be tested, however,
because the DoJ has not published the AuM for the indi-
vidual banks and the three periods separately. For most
participating banks, they only publish the maximumAuM
over all three periods together.
The DoJ has also published the maximum number of
U.S.-related accounts for each bank. According to the pro-
gram, this data should not affect the penalty. Interestingly,
the DoJ was careful to document this information for each
bank. This leads us to believe that it did play a role in some
way. We will argue that the average assets per account,
AuM/accounts, is a useful explanatory variable.
The NPAs describe in some detail the DoJ’s findings
concerning the activities of each bank relevant to allow-
ing or helping customers avoid taxation. We have col-
lected 30 such practices, see Table 1. The practices range
from rather benign behavior, such as “e-banking, retail
and private banking services for U.S. clients” (A24), to
much more dubious actions, such as “assisted in the fal-
sification of documents” (A3). We will experiment with
different collections of these activities as regressors to find
a combination that helps explain the penalties.
Finally, we have collected balance sheet data for as many
banks as possible for the year 2013. In particular, we have
collected the size of the balance sheets, capital, earnings,
and profit of 60 banks. For 18 banks—all specializing
in private banking7—we do not have access to annual
reports.
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics of the data.
The penalty, assets, number of accounts, and average
account size data are extremely skewed. The logarith-
mic versions of those variables are more symmetrically
distributed. In order to avoid the results being dom-
inated by the banks with the largest penalties, most
AuM, and most or largest accounts, we will mostly
work with logarithmic data. One bank did not have to
pay a penalty (Banca Intermobiliare di Investimenti e
Gestioni (Suisse) SA), so this bank is dropped from our
sample as well.
Figure 1 depicts more detailed information about the
data in order to assess selection effects when dropping
the private banks for which no balance sheet data are
available. The chart provides kernel estimates of the main
variables for the subset of banks that are in the sample
with balance sheet data, and the ones that are excluded
from this sample. Visual inspection suggests that there is
not a great difference between the two samples, except
with respect to average account size. The excluded pri-
vate banks had significantly larger accounts than the other
banks.
Results
As stated in the program, the determinants of the penalty
are the maximum aggregate assets under management
in U.S.-related accounts. The difficulty is that the pro-
gram distinguishes between three points in time, namely
August 1, 2008, between August 1, 2008, and February
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Table 1 Activities of banks as described by the DoJ
ACTIVITIES
A1 [75] Post withholding service A16 [19] Assisting the bank’s clients in concealing assets and
income from IRS
A2 [61] Numbered accounts/pseudonyms/code name A17 [20] maintaining insurance wrappers
A3 [3] Assisted in the falsification of documents A18 [39] (Account closure via) excessive cash, precious metal
withdrawal, cashing checks, bearer shares, or fictitious
donations
A4 [37] Cash cards or credit cards (Anonymous cash with-
drawal)
A19 [29] Transfer of assets from closed accounts to non-US-
related accounts or accounts at other banks held
by non-US relatives/friends or removing name of US
taxpayer clients from joint accounts
A5 [2] Lombard loans secure by (uncleared) assets A20 [18] Permitted relationship managers to meet or have
direct contact with US beneficial owner, even such
who did not have powers of attorney over the entity
accounts
A6 [45] Inaccurate account documentation (missing or false
forms)
A21 [15] Referred or provided US taxpayers with the names
of outside services providers who could create struc-
tures or assisted them with creating structures
A7 [22] Accounts in the name of non-US-persons that were
owned by US taxpayers
A22 [1] Remove bank letterhead from account statements
A8 [56] Accounts in the name of foundations/companies
with US residents as their beneficial owners
A23 [5] Transmitting undeclared assets to a US taxpayer client
in a hidden manner (for instance by delivering cash in
person)
A9 [4] Advise clients to conceal their US nexuses from bank
documentation or avoid bringing account informa-
tion to the US
A24 [9] e-banking, retail, and private banking services for US
clients
A10 [9] Issuing checks drawn on the client’s/customer’s
account or wire transfers
A25 [6] Transfer of assets from US-related accounts through
non-US accounts en route to accounts at unaffiliated
banks to conceal the US relatedness of these accounts
A11 [3] Issuing checks drawn on one of the bank’s accounts A26 [2] Discussing Swiss banking secrecy with US taxpayer clients
A12 [45] Opening accounts for persons that left other banking
being investigated by the DOJ or have been exited or
left during the financial crisis
A27 [1] Failing to adopt an account-closing protocol
A13 [1] Destroying correspondence upon request A28 [1] Transitory account
A14 [10] Concealment of communications through pre-
paid mobile phones, fax, or personal email or
communication by confidential means in general
A29 [1] Advisory or booking center
A15 [5] No registration of US taxpayer clients as US persons in
the bank’s IT system
A30 [24] Structured payments
Note: Ax is the code used in the regression tables. The number in square parentheses is the number of banks that are assigned the respective activity in the DoJ findings.
Activities written in italic font are not used in regressions because they are too common or too rare
28, 2009, and after February 28, 2009. However, the data
published by the DoJ for most participating banks do not
distinguish these three periods; only the maximum over
the three periods is published. Moreover, the penalty is
levied only on those assets that were unknown to the IRS
at the time the program began, but the published data
does not reveal the share of assets that were shown by the
bank to be tax compliant. As a consequence, our model is
necessarily miss-specified.
Category 2 banks held, according to the DoJ data, about
USD 50 billion U.S. assets under management (AuM). If
all these assets were not tax compliant, the total penalty
would have to be between 20 and 50% of this value, that
is, between USD 10 and USD 25 billion. Yet, the penal-
ties were only USD 1.37 billion, which is between 5.5 and
13.7% of the values we would expect if all AuM were non-
compliant. Therefore, apparently, the banks were unable
to establish tax compliance for 5.5 to 13.7% of their AuM,
or vice versa, between 86.3 and 94.5% of the assets in
category 2 banks were indeed tax compliant.
Despite the unavoidable miss-specification, a regression
pi = β0 + β1 · AuMi + εi, (1)
where pi is bank i’s penalty, is a start. If the complete
AuM had evaded U.S. taxation, βi should be between 0.2
and 0.5, according to the definition of the program. In
Table 3, column 1, we report that this coefficient is only
0.02, which is consistent with the assessment we made
before that the major part of the AuM were indeed tax
compliant.
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Table 2 Some descriptive statistics (penalties and AuM in million USD; capital and balance sheet in million CHF)
Penalty AuM Accounts AuM per
account
Capital 2013 Balance sheet 2013 Capital share
2013
Variable
Mean 17.53 641.33 449.90 1.504 851.17 10622.4 0.1056
Median 4.202 200.48 187 1.112 395.32 4336.64 0.08323
Maximum 211.0 7650.0 3500 7.914 6947.0 115193 0.3884
Minimum 0.00 6.90 13 0.085 13.686 81.125 0.01277
Std dev 36.88 1209.6 649.7 1.450 1180.8 17261.7 0.0711
Skewness 3.594 3.649 2.866 2.260 2.752 3.973 2.511
Kurtosis 16.888 18.416 11.843 9.123 13.275 23.626 9.611
Observations 78 78 78 78 60 60 60
Log(variable)
Mean 1.481 5.386 5.375 0.0106 5.772 8.203 – 2.431
Median 1.448 5.313 5.231 0.0822 5.980 8.378 – 2.500
Maximum 5.352 8.942 8.161 2.069 8.846 11.654 – 0.9458
Minimum – 4.701 1.932 2.565 – 2.468 2.616 4.396 – 4.361
Std dev 1.844 1.516 1.272 0.9394 1.615 1.683 0.5416
Skewness – 0.479 0.057 – 0.056 – 0.304 – 0.215 – 0.269 – 0.539
Kurtosis 4.114 2.793 2.665 3.062 1.880 2.241 6.980
Observations 77 77 77 77 59 59 59
To account for the highly skewed distribution of the
data, we will use the logarithmic specification of (1).
Note that now the coefficient β1 should be 1 according
to the definition of the program because the relation-
ship between AuM and penalty ought to be linear, hence
exhibiting unit elasticity. Table 3, column 2, reports that
β1 is indeed close to unity, though statistically slightly
smaller.8
We now add the activities, as identified by the DoJ in
the individual NPAs, as explanatory variables. If we add
these activity dummies individually to Eq. (2), activities
A4, A9, A19, A20, and A24 turn out to be significant at
the 5% level. If we use these five dummies simultaneously,
A20 and A24 lose their significance.We therefore keep the
remaining three activities in the regression,
log(pi) = β0 + β1 · log(AuMi)
+ β2 · A4 + β3 · A9 + β4 · A19 + εi. (3)
The results are reported in Table 3, column 3. The
coefficients of the activities are all positive, indicating
that banks that did pursue these activities did face larger
fines.
As reported, the DoJ carefully collected and reported
the number of U.S.-related accounts, despite the fact that
the number of accounts is not a determinant of the penalty
according to the definition of the program. However, the
(logarithmic) number of accounts indeed turns out to have
a statistically significant explanatory power,
log(pi) = β0 + β1 · log(AuMi)
+ β2 · A4 + β3 · A9 + β4 · A19 (4)
+ β5 · log(accounts) + εi.
Table 3, column 4, reveals one unsatisfactory feature
of this specification, though the elasticity of AuM with
respect to penalties is clearly not 1 anymore. According to
the program, there should be a linear relationship between
these variables, and thus the elasticity should be unity. We
can remedy this shortcoming by not using the number of
accounts per se as a regressor, but the average size of the
accounts, AuM/accounts,
log(pi) = β0 + β1 · log(AuMi)
+ β2 · A4 + β3 · A9 + β4 · A19 (5)
+ β5 · log(AuM/accounts) + εi.
Table 3, column 5, shows that this reestablishes the unit
elasticity of AuM.We will argue below that there is a good
reason to assume that the size of the accounts held at the
banks contains important information about the ability
of the banks to establish the tax compliance of their cus-
tomers, and this affected the penalty the banks ultimately
had to pay.
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Fig. 1 Distributions (kernels) of some data. The solid lines are for the 60 banks for which we have balance sheet data; the dashed lines are for the 18
banks for which we do not
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We also consider a quadratic specification of the size
variable in Table 3, column 6, and find that it is superior
to the linear specification.
Table 3, column 7, is the same specification, but using
only the sample of banks for which we have accounting
data (which will be used in the following regressions).
The differences are small and give us no indication of
important selection effects.
One might wonder if the ability of banks to pay penal-
ties might have played a role as well. There is no men-
tion of this in the program, but as a general principle,
one purpose of criminal law is the “deterrence of fur-
ther criminal conduct” (Holder (1999), Section II.B), and
this can only be achieved if the fine is to some extent
painful for the corporation. We therefore check whether
some basic bank balance sheet data help to explain the
size of the fines. First, we control for the size of the
bank, measured by balance sheet or by capital, Table 3,
columns 8 and 9, respectively. We find that both vari-
ables have no significant influence. Next, we measure the
ability of the bank to pay by its solvency, simply mea-
sured as the share of capital in relation to the size of
the balance sheet. We add plain solvency as well as its
logarithmic version as regressors, Table 3, columns 10
and 11. Solvency has the expected positive coefficient
and, interestingly, turns out to be significant at the
10% level.
Finally, note that it took the DoJ about 10 months from
the first to the last NPA for category 2 banks. The first
NPAwas issued onMarch 30, 2015, the last on January 26,
2016. It is possible that the DoJ changed its stance as time
went by. Indeed, adding the date of the NPA as a regres-
sor produces a statistically significant negative coefficient,
see Table 3, columns 12 and 13. So it appears that, control-
ling for everything else, the DoJ set smaller fines towards
the end of the program than at the beginning. The date of
the NPA is measured in years, and the variable varies from
0 for the first NPA to 0.83 for the last. The coefficient of
– 1.2 therefore induces a difference of − 1.2 · 0.83 ≈ −1.0
from the first to the last NPA. A logarithmic difference of
this size amounts to exp(−1.0) ≈ 1/3. This means that
the fines toward the end of the program were reduced
to about a third of the size of those at the beginning. It
is not possible to know whether this is a reflection of an
evolving policy of the DoJ, whether there were personnel
changes that led to this changed behavior, or whether the
DoJ chose to deal with the “hard cases” about which they
suspected more wrongdoing first (without this being fully
captured by our activities dummies), and hence demanded
higher fines.
The last specification, Table 3, column 14, is the same as
specification 13, except that we have now dropped activity
A19, which is no longer significant. As a result, the sol-
vency variable and the quadratic account size variable gain
some significance, but otherwise the results are quantita-
tively almost unchanged.
Figure 2 depicts the parts of the individual (logarith-
mic) penalties that are explained by the components of
version (14) of the regression.9 AuM is clearly the domi-
nant factor, as it should be, given the rules of the program.
However, the average size of the accounts also contributes,
in some instances significantly. The same applies to the
two activities (A4 and A9). Solvency and the date of the
NPAs appear to contribute comparatively less.
The size variable and the role of solvency
We have found that the average size of the accounts and
the solvency of the bank has a statistically significant and
economically meaningful effect on the fines the banks had
to pay. We now discuss possible reasons for these effects.
To understand why the average size of the accounts
should have had an effect on the penalty, let us consider
two banks that paid similar penalties, but had very dif-
ferent compositions of accounts. The (logarithmic) mean
of the AuM per account across all banks in our sample
is USD 0.83 million. Migrosbank reported USD 273 mil-
lion U.S.-related AuM, and 898 such accounts. This makes
USD 0.3 million per account on average, which is signifi-
cantly smaller than the average across all banks. Migros-
bank paid a fine of about USD 15 million. According to
our estimate (regression (11)), if Migrosbank’s accounts
had been equal to the average USD 0.83 million, its fine
would have been only USD 7.3 million, which is only half
of what it paid. Compare this to Rothschild Bank. This
bank reported USD 1,500 million U.S.-related AuM in
332 accounts. This makes USD 4.5 million per account
on average, so the account balances of Rothschild’s clients
were much larger than those of the average bank. Roth-
schild Bank paid a smaller fine than Migrosbank, namely
USD 11.5 million, despite having much more U.S.-related
AuM. If it had had the average account size, its penalty
would have beenmuch larger, namely about USD 74.4mil-
lion according to our estimate.
It is possible that large clients were on average more
tax compliant than small clients, or maybe it was easier
for Rothschild Bank to push its larger clients into volun-
tary disclosure and establish the tax compliance of these
accounts, while Migrosbank was not able to do so for its
smaller clients. It is, unfortunately, not possible to test this
hypothesis because the amount of delinquent AuM is not
available.
About the significance of solvency, one possible argu-
ment for the influence of this variable is that the DoJ
wanted to avoid sending a bank into bankruptcy by charg-
ing too large a fine. On closer inspection of the data, this
reasoning appears unconvincing, however. Figure 3 plots
the capital ratios of the category 2 banks at the end of
2013, and the capital ratios that would have resulted if they
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Fig. 2 Contributions of the exogenous variables (regression version 14)
Fig. 3 The penalties had a minimal effect on the solvency of most banks. Solvency is measured as capital divided by the size of the balance sheet.
“Before penalty” means the balance sheet data of the bank as reported in the 2013 end of year annual report. “After penalty” subtracts the penalty
(in CHF, using the end of year exchange rate of 1 USD = 0.8929 CHF) from capital, and divides again by the balance sheet
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had had to pay the fines at that moment. The fines were
quantitatively much too small compared to the capital of
the banks to have a pronounced effect on their solvency.
The DoJ could have imposed much harsher fines without
jeopardizing any of the banks. Some category 2 banks did
go out of business during the program10, but this was not
due to its becoming insolvent because of the size of the
fine. The reason, then, why the solvency variable turns out
to be statistically and economically significant, remains
unclear.
Conclusion
The program spells out a rule for determining the penal-
ties. Unfortunately, it is not possible to verify that this rule
was applied because the DoJ has not published the data
in the necessary detail. For instance, the NPAs do list the
maximum assets under management related to U.S. enti-
ties. However, for most banks, the DoJ does not publish
when these accounts were in operation (which, according
to the program, has an influence on the penalty), and how
much of the AuM was shown by the banks to be tax com-
pliant. Our analysis suggests that, overall, between 86 and
95% of the U.S. assets in category 2 banks were tax com-
pliant. With the available data, we do find strong evidence
that the amount of U.S.-related assets under management
has a strong positive influence on the fines, as is to be
expected.
The DoJ has collected and published relevant practices
that banks were engaged in. We identify a small num-
ber of such activities that seem to help explain some of
the variance in the fines. The activities we identify have
to do with allowing customers to withdraw cash anony-
mously, or helping them conceal their accounts from U.S.
tax authorities.
Furthermore, we find that banks with many small
accounts paid larger fines than banks with few, but large,
accounts. It is not completely clear why this is so. It is
possible that larger clients were more tax compliant on
average than smaller clients, or it is possible that the banks
had more difficulty in proving tax compliance for many
small clients compared to few large clients.11
In addition, we do find some tentative evidence that the
DoJ imposed higher fines on well-capitalized banks. It is
not possible to determine whether this was by design or
not. It is unlikely that avoiding driving a bank into a sol-
vency crisis was a major consideration for the DoJ; the
fines were simply too small for that. However, it is possible
that the DoJ felt that it could and should extractmore from
a well-capitalized bank. Yet, it is also possible that this
statistical result stems from the necessarily miss-specified
model.
Finally, we find evidence that the DoJ over the course
of the program significantly reduced the fines. Banks
that settled later received a better deal than banks that
settled earlier. Again, it is not possible to know whether
this was the intention of the DoJ, whether its policy
gradually evolved over time, or whether this is con-
nected to the sequence the DoJ set at the outset when
it decided to prioritize some dossiers at the expense
of others.
In conclusion, it is notable that the sums that have been
transferred from the Swiss banks in categories 1 and 2 to
the U.S. government are substantial. So far, these banks
have paid USD 5.8 billion in fines. In addition, the legal
cost for the banks must have been very high as well. There
are no publicly available data on that, but a legal conflict
that lasts several years for high stakes and that involves
U.S. law enforcement is bound to be expensive. More-
over, U.S. tax subjects that were identified by the program
were also prosecuted and were billed for taxes and fines,
although no final account of these payments is publicly
available.12 The U.S. government made a hefty gain from
the program. On the other hand, the program has allowed
the Swiss banking industry to leave the conflict behind
in a structured and relatively quick fashion. The financial
legacy that still remains today is several category 1 banks
which are still awaiting a settlement.
More broadly, the program has paved the way towards
the fall of Swiss bank secrecy with respect to a wide array
of jurisdictions. As of today, Switzerland has signed agree-
ments to exchange information automatically about for-
eign customers of Swiss banks with 41 jurisdictions. The
Swiss banking industry has been permanently changed by
this program.
Endnotes
1 The law is intended to protect Swiss sovereignty and
forbids official activities on Swiss soil to the benefit of for-
eign countries, see Husmann (2014) for a critical view of
the approach that was used by the Swiss government to
allow banks to cooperate.
2 The deadline for the LOI of category 3 and 4 banks
was later extended to December 31, 2014, see DoJ Tax
Division (2014).
3 In a DPA, charges are filed with a federal court but
are dismissed after all obligations have been fulfilled. In
an NPA, no charges are filed with a federal court, see
Alexander and Cohen (2015).
4 The largest individual penalty for a category 2 bank
was the USD 211m that was paid by BSI, a bank that has
in the meantime been implicated in the 1MDB case and
has been sold (https://www.finma.ch/en/news/2016/05/
20160524-mm-bsi/).
5DoJ press release number 17-910 of August 15,
2017, https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/acting-manhattan-
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us-attorney-announces-agreement-swiss-asset-
management-firm-resolve-criminal
6Morgan Stanley, Goldman Sachs, Lloyds Banking
Group, Banque Morval, BC Fribourg, BC Genève, Bar-
clays Bank (Suisse), Barclays Capital (Zürich Branch of
Barclays Bank London), VP Bank (Schweiz).
7 Lombard Odier, Coutts, HSZH Verwaltungs AG,
Gonet, Bordier, Baumann, Banque Pasche, Standard
Chartered Bank, PBZ, Finter Bank Zürich, Reichmuth,
BHF-Bank, E. Gutzwiller, Société Generale Private Bank-
ing (Lugano-Svizzera), Arvest Privatbank, Leodan Privat-
bank, Credito Privato Commerciale, Bellerive.
8One bank is dropped from the sample because its
penalty was zero.
9More precisely, the bars indicate the contributions
for an individual bank minus the average contribu-
tion over all banks: for example, contributionAuM(i) =
1.2004·[ log(AuM(i)) − mean(log(AuM))]. For the activ-
ities dummies, we do not correct for the sample average:
contributionactivities(i) = 0.5310 · A4(i) + 0.4996 · A9(i).
10 Credito Privato Commerciale SA voluntarily went
out of business in June 2012, but still received an NPA
and paid a fine in July 2015. Banca della Svizzera Italiana
(BSI) was purchased by EFG International in 2016, after
losing its license in Singapore “for serious breaches of
anti-money laundering requirements, poor management
oversight of the bank’s operations, and gross misconduct
by some of the bank’s staff” (http://www.mas.gov.sg/
News-and-Publications/Media-Releases/2016/MAS-
directs-BSI-Bank-to-shut-down-in-Singapore.aspx).
11 In fact, the DoJ has acknowledged the difficulty that
banks faced in demonstrating tax compliance and has
in the process extended the deadline for providing such
evidence, see DoJ Tax Division (2014).
12One source is a speech by former Deputy Attorney
General James M. Cole, in which he mentions that, as a
result of the program, over 43,000 U.S. taxpayers volun-
tarily disclosed to the IRS and paid over USD 6 billion in
taxes and penalties (Cole 2014).
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